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Abstract
The objective of this study was to investigate physicians' compliance with recommendations for drug substitutes
embedded within an electronic medical record, to assess factors affecting compliance, and to evaluate
associated cost savings. An exploratory study of all physicians in all clinics operated by a large health
maintenance organization (HMO) was conducted using a transparent computerized agent that collected 1.21
million prescriptions prescribed by 647 physicians. Compliance with HMO recommendations for substitute drugs
reached a 70 percent rate. Substitute type, whether generic or therapeutic, was found to be the most
significant factor affecting compliance, with physician workload and age second and third in effect
magnitude, respectively. Compliance was found to be non-automatic and selective, following a thoughtful
cognitive process. The HMO realized at least a 4 percent reduction in costs for prescribed drugs as a result of
compliance with substitute recommendations. The results can be interpreted via the lens of Organizational
Justice Theory, assuming that the broad compliance with generic substitutes was driven by perception of just
procedures, whereas there was no such perception in the case of therapeutic substitutes. While more research
is warranted for investigating the motivations driving physicians' compliance, we strongly feel that the results
can be generalized to other HMOs and healthcare settings.
Keywords: Health Care IT (Special Issue), Electronic Medical Record, Physician Compliance, Drug Cost
Containment, Organizational Justice Theory.
* Fay Cobb Payton, Guy Paré, Cynthia LeRouge, and Madhu Reddy were the accepting guest editors. This
article was submitted on 6th June 2010 and went through two revisions.
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Drug Prescription Notifications
1. Introduction
Healthcare costs are escalating world-wide. According to a 2006 report of the Organization for
Economic and Co-operation Development (OECD) (figures for later years are yet to be published),
national healthcare expenditures ranged from 15.3 percent (U.S.) to 6 percent (Mexico, Korea,
Poland) of countries’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Annual growth rates between the years 2000
and 2006 were above 10 percent in several countries, surpassing the growth of the respective
economies (OECD, 2007; Schur, Berk, & Yegian, 2004). Spending on prescription drugs in the US, for
example, increased by 14 percent between 2004 and 2007 (Daly, 2007), and drug expenditures
exceeded 12 percent of the total healthcare expenditure in 2006 (KFF, 2007).
Interventions used by insurers to contain drug costs frequently require physicians' compliance. When
compliance is not forthcoming, cost containment is not achieved. In other cases, achievement of cost
containment has resulted in a decrease in quality of care (Shamliyan, Duval, Du, & Kane, 2008).
While electronic medical records systems (EMR) have been advocated as a means for meeting these
cost and quality challenges, recent studies have marginally substantiated this assertion (Delpierre et
al., 2004; DesRoches et al., 2008; Shamliyan et al., 2008; Wolfstadt et al., 2008). Two obstacles to
achieving these goals are physicians' resistance (Piderit, 2000) and their preference to maintain
existing behaviors (Coch & French, 1948). In this sense, a compliant behavior has been used as
evidence of reduced resistance (Sagie, Elizur, & Greenbaum, 1985), which health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) strive to secure in order to achieve enhanced quality of healthcare while
containing costs.
Voluntary EMR adoption by independent care providers can be regarded to some degree as
compliance with governmental requests (Goldman, 2009) and is believed to enhance healthcare
efficiency (Ginsburg, Doherty, Ralston, & Senkeeto, 2008; Matheny et al., 2008; Mongan, Ferris, &
Lee, 2008; Reynolds, Harper, Jenner, & Dunne, 2008; Shamliyan et al., 2008; Weber, 2008; Wolfstadt
et al., 2008). However, in spite of two decades of efforts, EMR adoption rates are still only around 14
percent of primary care physicians in the US (DesRoches et al., 2008). Among reasons for nonadoption of EMR technology are: questionable return on investment, risks of privacy breach or
records unavailability, user interface difficulties, and questionable effectiveness (Blumenthal, 2009;
Jha et al., 2009a, 2009b; Kush, Helton, Rockhold, & Hardison, 2008; Martens et al., 2008; Shachak,
Hadas-Dayagi, Ziv & Reis, 2009; Vardy, Kayam, & Kitai, 2008). HMOs that have adopted EMRs
encounter similar difficulties, confronting internal resistance to use the systems and comply with new
organizational processes (Connell & Young, 2007; Jensen & Aanestad, 2007; Reardon & Davidson,
2007; Subramanian et al., 2007).
While the rates of EMR adoption or non-adoption is by now fairly clear, this is not the case for care
provider compliance with computerized notifications embedded within implemented EMRs to improve
quality of care or reduce costs. Recent studies focusing on the effectiveness of computerized
reminders yielded mixed results (Matheny et al., 2008; Sequist et al., 2005), with effectiveness
declining over time (Demakis et al., 2000). Most of this research was conducted in institutions where
the investigated behavior involved recently implemented systems or experimental environments,
hindering the generalizability of the results.
Against this background, the objective of this study was to examine physicians' compliance with a wellestablished intervention to contain costs of prescription drugs without decreasing the quality of care
administered by a large HMO. We conducted the study in the normal organizational environment, where
we transparently monitored the natural behavior of the physician population employed by the studied
HMO in all its clinics. The intervention involved a notification about HMO-recommended substitutes
issued to the physician by the drug prescription module of the EMR. We examined the patterns of
physicians’ compliance with notifications, both in general and in relation to their demographic traits, as
well as the contribution of compliance to containment of drug costs. We employed an exploratory
epistemology, hence, we did not attempt to test any hypotheses. Rather, we wanted to examine the
actual physicians' behavior and suggest a plausible theoretical explanation for future research.
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The strength and importance of this work is in the comprehensiveness of the data, which is rooted in
a normal organizational setting, in the rigorous statistical analyses, and in the theoretical and practical
implications derived. Furthermore, although the results represent one organization, we are confident
in their generalizability and external validity under similar circumstances.
The paper is organized as follows: the next two sections present the background, including review of
the literature, description of the study environment, and explanation of the theoretical lens for this
paper, followed by the research method. We then present the results, leading to the discussion and
conclusions.

2. Background
Drug prescription is a primary component of medical care, yet it suffers from quality and cost
problems and ineffective response to administrative measures that address both these concerns
(Kuperman & Gibson, 2003; Shamliyan et al., 2008). To overcome cost problems, several cost
containment measures have been attempted, of which the most common are: (1) administering drug
formularies (Huskamp et al., 2005); (2) shifting to generic-drug-only coverage (Patterson et al., 2005);
and (3) instituting co-payments (Gibson, Ozminkowski, & Goetzel, 2005). All three measures,
however, although successful in achieving cost containment (Huskamp et al., 2003a), are contingent
on care providers' compliance with organizational procedures, and can also bear undesirable health
consequences (Gibson et al., 2005) when patients, particularly sensitive populations such as elderly
patients, deviate from disciplined drug consumption due to financial difficulties (Goldman et al., 2004;
Huskamp et al., 2003b; Reed, Brand, Newhouse, Selby, & Hsu, 2008; Steinman, Sands, & Covinsky,
2001).
Prior research about physicians' compliance with various manual or computerized clinical procedures,
introduced to increase quality of care, reduce costs, or minimize errors, generally revealed either
marginal success or none (Matheny et al., 2008; Sanders & Satyvavolu, 2002; Sequist et al., 2005;
Tamblyn et al., 2006).
Physicians' response to clinical reminders can be divided into four behavioral categories: compliance,
reliance, spillover, and reactance. Compliance is defined as the tendency to perform an action when a
clinical monitor issues an alert; reliance is defined as a tendency to refrain from performing an action
when the warning system does not indicate that it is necessary (Meyer, 2004); spillover is defined as
"the spread or expansion of responses, activities, or roles from one instance, system, or domain, to
another" (Vashitz et al., 2009, p. 318); and reactance (or non-compliance) is defined as "an
unpleasant motivational state, in which people react to situations [where] they feel their autonomy is
threatened, in ways that reaffirm their freedom or autonomy" (Vashitz et al., 2009, p. 318). Barriers to
compliance with clinical reminders identified by prior research include lack of time, poor patient
compliance, and physicians' lack of knowledge of, awareness to, or disagreement with specific
guidelines (Sequist et al., 2005). User interface and other usability issues were likewise identified as
hindering adherence to clinical reminders (Patterson et al., 2005), as well as workload and patient
characteristics (Mayo-Smith & Agrawal, 2007; Sittig, Krall, Dykstra, Russell, & Chin, 2006).
As elaborated upon next, the HMO under study here employed a combined policy of drug formulary,
co-payment, and differentiated cost coverage based on the type of drug prescribed. The policy was
administered via a computerized drug prescription module embedded in an EMR whose use is
mandatory yet open to various levels of compliance.

2.1. Description of the Study Environment
Israeli citizens are fully insured through the Israeli National Insurance Law, and can enroll with one of
four HMOs that provide full health coverage to their members. EMR systems have been widely
implemented in Israel since the early 1990s. All primary care physicians, as well as practitioners in
most secondary care clinics of the studied HMO have been using the studied EMR system for nearly
20 years (Pliskin, 1994; Pliskin, Glezerman, Modai, & Weiler, 1996). The other three HMOs either use
this same or a similar EMR system. Thus, all primary care and the vast majority of secondary
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healthcare records in Israel are fully computerized. The EMR system facilitates electronic real-time
documentation of all physician-patient encounters during a visit and selective context-based data
retrieval during treatment monitoring, including various clinical alerts and decision aids. In addition to
order entry for drugs (via a built-in drug-prescription module), the EMR system supports such
processes as laboratory referrals, expert consultation and imaging, and a bi-directional interface with
administrative computerized systems, used to validate patient coverage and transmit various
administrative data, for example, for cost calculation purposes. Based on DeRoches et al.'s (2008)
classification, this is a comprehensive EMR.
The built-in drug prescription module, which is the only method practiced at the HMO for generating
drug prescriptions, displays clinical details relevant to the prescription process, including patient
clinical information, current and previous drugs prescribed to the patient, alerts of drug contradictions
upon prescribing new drugs, and known allergies or sensitivities. The system also presents a list of
drugs from which the physician may select. The list (see Figure 1) reflects the HMO's drug formulary,
where drugs are ordered from the most to least preferred according to the HMO policy for drug
coverage. The list contains ample information about each drug, some visible and some available
upon clicking (e.g., administrative and pharmacological information). The first time a prescription is
called for, the physicians may select any drug from the list as an initial choice. Upon prescribing a
non-preferred drug, the drug-prescription module notifies the physician about available HMOpreferred generic substitutes (where the substitute is identical in chemical formulation to the patent
drug) or therapeutic substitutes (where the substitute is not identical but is known to yield similar
therapeutic results). More specifically, when a physician prescribes a non-preferred drug as an initial
choice, the notification screen pops up and notifies the physician in real time: "Have you considered
prescribing XXXX?" (See Appendix 1) The physician can then either choose the proposed preferred
substitute instead of his/her initial choice. However, if the notification is ignored and the final choice is
the same as the initial choice, s/he is asked to fill out an online form and explain the reasons for noncompliance (See Appendix 2). Physicians know that HMO administration can access these forms and
examine their explanations. This feature is activated only for drugs with HMO-preferred substitutes
that are prescribed to a patient for the first time. Clearly, the HMO's objective is to maximize
physicians' compliance.

Drug List

Sensitivities

Patient Clinical Information

Active Drugs

Currently Prescribed Drugs

Figure 1. The Drug Prescription Module
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2.2. Compliance as an Organizational Behavior–the Organizational Justice Lens
The present exploratory study aimed to examine a behavior rather than to substantiate theoretical
hypotheses. Yet, there is merit in a post-hoc theoretical interpretation of the factors found to affect
compliance, believed to be a desirable organizational behavior, linked to other positive organizational
outcomes such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, withdrawal, and organizational
citizenship (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001).
Of the four types of adherence behavior defined by Vashitz et al. (2009)--compliance, reliance,
spillover, and reactance--physicians in the present study could only demonstrate compliance or
reactance behaviors. Thus, we define compliance as adherence to drug substitute notification, either
initially (self-compliance) or in response to a notification (assisted compliance). Non-compliance or
reactance is refusal to adhere to a drug substitute recommendation even after being notified.
Two quite different theories that attempt to explain compliance behavior are the deterrence model and
the accommodative model (Kagan & Scholz, 1984). The deterrence theory argues that people are
motivated entirely by profit-seeking, assessing opportunities and risks and disobeying when the
anticipated risks are small compared with the profits to be made through non-compliance (Kagan &
Scholz, 1984). Advocates of the deterrence view believe that individuals will only comply with an
authority’s rules and decisions when confronted with harsh sanctions and penalties. Clearly, this was
not the case in the studied HMO, where physicians neither directly benefited from complying, nor
were penalized for not complying. The accommodative theory maintains that attitudes and moral
obligations, in addition to economic calculations or fear of punishment, are important in explaining
compliance behavior and, therefore, need to be considered when managing non-compliance
(Braithwaite, 2002).
Related to the accommodative model of compliance behavior is Tyler’s (1990) theory on compliance,
according to which, people’s compliance behavior is strongly linked to views about justice and
injustice. In particular, he suggests that procedural justice plays an important role in peoples’
decisions to comply with rules and regulations. Procedural justice is a refinement of the organizational
justice or fairness theory, which initially dealt with the fairness of outcome distribution or allocation
and the fairness of the procedures used to determine this distribution or allocation (Adams, 1965).
This type of organizational justice was termed distributive justice (Leventhal, 1976). Later work
introduced the concept of the fair process effect into the organizational justice literature, termed
procedural justice (Folger, 1977; Leventhal, 1976; Lind & Tyler, 1988).
Procedural justice concerns the perceived fairness of the procedures involved in decision making and
the perceived treatment one receives from a decision maker. The procedural justice literature
demonstrates that people’s reactions to their personal experiences with authorities are rooted in their
evaluations of the fairness of the procedures those agencies use to exercise their authority (Lind &
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000). A procedure should meet six criteria to be perceived as fair: a) be
applied consistently across people and across time; b) be free from bias (e.g., ensuring that a third
party has no vested interest in the particular settlement); c) ensure that accurate information is
collected and used in making decisions; d) have some mechanism to correct flawed or inaccurate
decisions; e) conform to personal or prevailing standards of ethics or morality; and f) ensure that the
opinions of various groups affected by the decision have been taken into account (Colquitt et al.,
2001; Leventhal, 1976).
Focusing on the importance of interpersonal treatment people receive when procedures are
implemented, Bies and Moag (1986) suggested differentiating interactional justice from procedural
justice. Further work (Greenberg, 1990; Greenberg, 1993) hypothesized interpersonal justice to
consist of two dimensions: interactional justice, which refers to the degree to which people are treated
with politeness, dignity, and respect by the authorities involved in executing procedures, and
informational justice, which focuses on the explanations provided to people that convey information
about why procedures were used in a certain way (Colquitt et al., 2001). There are, however,
conflicting results concerning the discriminant validity of procedural justice, interactional, and
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informational justice, therefore, many researchers (see Colquitt et al., 2001 for details) have
operationalized procedural justice by measuring process control as suggested by Leventhal (1976)
along with interactional and informational justice in one combined scale.
There is empirical evidence to show that people who feel they have been treated in a procedurally fair
manner by an organization will be more inclined to accept its decisions and follow its directions (Lind
& Tyler, 1988; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). It has also been found that people are more likely to
challenge a situation collectively when they believe that the procedures are unfair (Greenberg, 1987;
Murphy, 2003; Tyler, 1990).
Organizational justice theory is relevant to the context of this study because the drug substitute
intervention studied here affects physicians' professional autonomy and self esteem, and because the
issuing HMO clearly has vested interests in the outcomes, as have the patients. Therefore, we chose
to explain the results via this lens, as further elaborated in the concluding section.

3. Research Methods
3.1. Research Approach
As previously stated, the present study adopts the interpretive, exploratory epistemology, aiming to
examine routine behaviors of physicians who are proficient users of a drug prescription module within
an EMR that includes drug substitution notifications.

3.2. Studied Intervention
At the time of the study, the HMO's catalog included about 2,600 drugs, to which substitutes (either
generic or therapeutic) were offered for 1,443 drugs in 47 pharmacological groups. In describing the
studied intervention, italics highlight the terminology used:
The intervention is activated upon a physician prescribing a first-time prescription for a drug with
substitutes (a satisfying prescription), as opposed to a repeat prescription, where the same drug is represcribed for the patient. If at start time the physician's initial choice is a preferred drug (e.g., from
the top of the list), s/he is exhibiting self-compliance behavior. If not, s/he is notified about
recommended substitutes (Appendix 1) and can choose a preferred drug as a final choice, thus
exhibiting assisted-compliance behavior. Otherwise, an online form appears and the physician is
asked to specify the reasons for the non-compliance behavior (Appendix 2). The response time is the
time elapsed between the initial and final choices (which equals zero for self-compliance), including
the time required to fill out the form following non-compliance.

3.3. Study Design and Administration
Data collection for the study lasted 40 consecutive weeks from June 1, 2005 to February 28, 2006. To
collect data for this study, a transparent computerized agent was embedded into the drug prescription
module, recording for the entire physician population in all 176 primary care clinics of the HMO, and
for each prescription: the physician's ID, patient age, visit date and time, initial drug choice, final drug
choice, and the time elapsed between the two. Physician demographics were provided by the HMO
whose management approved the data collection. Physicians were unaware of the data collection;
hence, regular work practices were not disrupted and no bias was suspected. Data recorded by the
computerized agent were stored in real time in an MS-Access 2003 database and analyzed using
SPSS version 17.0.

3.4. Sample
We collected about 5 million prescriptions written by 2,120 physicians. However, only about 1.2
million prescriptions, prescribed by 647 physicians, were for satisfying prescriptions, invoking the
studied intervention because they were first-time prescriptions for drugs with substitutes.
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3.5. Statistical Analyses
We used the following methods: cross-tab analysis for the descriptive statistics; independent-samples
t-test for comparing means between self-employed and HMO-employed physicians; and multinomial
logistic regression for compliance analyses, with the dependent variable being the three compliance
types (1=self, 2=assisted, and 3=non) and the independent variables being substitution type
(1=generic, 2=therapeutic), employment type (1=self-employed, 2=HMO-employed), domain (1=GP,
2=specialist), gender (1=male, 2=female), country of medical education (1=Eastern Europe,
2=Western Europe, 3=North America, 4=South America, 5=Israel), average number of patient visits
per day, physician age, tenure with the HMO, and patient age. We standardized quantitative variables
indicating years or visits to cater to unit differences. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values for the
independent variables were around 1, indicating lack of multicollinearity. We employed a forward
stepwise entry method with score as the entry criterion and Wald as the removal criterion.
Additionally, we checked two-way interactions for all variables except country of education (because
of numerous combinations, the reporting of which is beyond the scope of this study). None of the
interaction effects was practically significant as the odds ratios were close to 1 (although all were
statistically significant due to the large sample). We examined correlations using univariate two-tailed
Pearson correlations. We assessed the lower bound on cost savings by calculating the difference
between the costs of the initial and final choices in the assisted-compliance group.

4. Results
4.1. Sample Description
We present descriptive statistics of the sample in Table 1. Two hundred ninety-seven (46 percent) of
the participating physicians were self-employed, whereas 350 (54 percent) were HMO-employed. The
percentage of specialists in the self-employed group (53 percent) was significantly higher than in the
HMO-employed group (22 percent), the rest being GPs. These two groups significantly differed on
several traits, such as average number of work days (self-employed worked more) and average
number of patients treated per day (self-employed treated more). The two groups, however, were not
significantly different in terms of age, average tenure on the job, and number of patient visits yielding
prescriptions.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Self-employed
Number of physicians
Number of General Practitioners/
Specialists
Average physician age (S.D.)

1

Average (S.D.) tenure on the job
Percent of females
Average (S.D.) number of work days
per physician during the study period
Average (S.D.) number of patient
visits per day
Percent of visits yielding
prescriptions

HMO-employed

Total

Significance

297

350

647

P<0.001

140 / 157

274 / 76

414 / 233

P<0.001

48.8 (7.7)

48.06 (9.17)

48.4 (8.53)

n.s.

9.17 (5.3)

9.12 (5.2)

9.14 (5.26)

n.s.

41%

62%

52 %

P<0.001

140.98 (55.53)

125.34 (48.72)

132.52 (52.5)

P<0.001

28.9 (17.18)

21.92 (10.96)

25.12 (14.57)

P<0.001

59.15%

60.97%

59.94%

n.s.

Number of satisfying prescriptions

667,362

547,885

1,212,247

P<0.001

Number of satisfying prescriptions
per physician

2,236.91
(2380.45)

1,565.39
(1440.45)

1,873.64
(1956.93)

P<0.001

1

All standard deviations reported are standard deviations of the original series values
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4.2. Compliance Patterns
Overall, the self-compliance rate (i.e., the ratio of self-compliance to the total number of satisfying
prescriptions) was 57.2 percent (Table 2). Of the remaining prescriptions (the difference between the
total number of satisfying prescriptions and the number of self-compliance prescriptions), the
assisted-compliance rate was 29.8 percent (13 percent of the total number of satisfying prescriptions),
leading to a 30 percent non-compliance rate and a 70 percent accumulated-compliance rate (the
difference between 100 percent and the non-compliance rate).
Table 2. Compliance Rate for Generic, Therapeutic and All Substitutes
Generic substitutes

Therapeutic substitutes

All Substitutes

Prescribed

Rate

% from
total

Prescribed

Rate

% from
total

Prescribed

Rate

% from
total

Selfcompliance

576,907

74%

74%

115,971

27%

27%

692,878

57%

57%

Assistedcompliance

127,585

63%

16%

27,096

9%

6%

154,681

30%

13%

Noncompliance

74,864

10%

10%

289,824

67%

67%

364,688

30%

30%

Total

779,356

100%

432,891

100%

1,212,247

100%

The results in Table 2 show a significantly higher tendency to comply with HMO recommendations for
generic substitutes than for therapeutic ones (p<0.001): for generic substitution, 74 percent selfcomplied and 63 percent of the others assisted-complied, bringing the accumulated-compliance rate
to 90 percent. For therapeutic substitution, however, only 27 percent self-complied, 8.5 percent of the
rest assisted-complied, bringing the accumulated-compliance rate to only 33 percent. Thus, the noncompliance rate was as high as 67 percent for therapeutic substitution but as low as 10 percent for
generic substitution.

4.3. Compliance Patterns and the Number of Recommended Substitutes
We observed a positive and statistically significant correlation (r=0.201, p<0.01) between log time and
the number of recommended substitute drugs on the list presented to the physician for therapeutic
substitutions and non-compliance. Thus, physicians tended not to comply and to adhere to their initial
choice when lists of recommended substitutes were longer, possibly avoiding the time required to
examine a long list of drugs, particularly therapeutic ones. Hence, the optimal number of listed
substitutes merits further investigation.

4.4. Learning Curves
Introduction of new drugs, one before data collection commenced, and one at Week 20 of data
collection, or changes in recommended substitutes, allowed for the elicitation of learning curves over
the 40 weeks of data collection. For introduction of new drugs, the learning period in Figures 2 and 3
is characterized by a continuous increase in assisted compliance, as well as in self-compliance,
toward stabilization. In Figure 3, the learning curve is steeper and accompanied by a sharp climb in
assisted compliance.
Also noteworthy is that a change in the drug policy of the HMO in the generic drug substitutes group
resulted in a steep decrease in self-compliance, compensated for by a high and stable assisted
compliance rate occurring within a week after policy change, while self-compliance remained low
(Figure 4). This, however, is not the case in the therapeutic substitutes group, where the assisted
compliance rate was low (Figure 5). Although self-compliance behaves similarly for the two groups,
the assisted-compliance rate for the therapeutic substitute was not affected and remained low.
Learning curves for drugs in drug groups where no such change occurred, show that self-compliance
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increased slightly with time, whereas assisted compliance tended to remain rather stable, implying
that the contribution of the system's notification capacity to compliance does not diminish over time,
and there is merit in continued notifications for existing as well as for new drugs.
BONE DISEASE (ALENDRONATE Group 165)

VITAMINS/MINERALS (TRIPLE B.

100%

100%

90%

90%

80%

80%

70%

70%

60%

60%

50%

50%

40%

40%

30%

30%

20%

20%

10%

10%

0%

Group 706)

0%

1

4

7

10 13 16 19

Self Compl.
Total Compl.

22 25 28 31 34 37

40

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39

Weeks
Assis. Compl.

Weeks
Self Compl.
Assis. Compl.
Total Compl.

Learninig curve

Figure 2. Learning Curve of a New Drug
(Introduced Before Start of Data Collection)

Figure 3. Learning Curve of a New Drug
Introduced at Week 20
ANTIVIRALS (ZOVIRAX Group623)

VITAMINS/MINERALS ( BABY A+D Group 256)
100%

Learning curve

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39

1

4

7

10

13

Self Compl.

Assis. Compl.

16

19

22

25

28

31

34

37

40

Weeks

Weeks
Total Compl.

Figure 4. Reaction to Change in
Recommendations (Generic Drug Substitute)

Self Compl.

Assis. Compl.

Total Compl.

Figure 5. Reaction to Change in
Recommendations (Therapeutic Substitute)

4.5. Resistance to Notifications
In certain pharmaceutical groups, efforts to impact physicians' drug prescription habits failed, as
depicted, for example, in Figure 6 for the antibiotics group. In one case, the HMO's effort to shift
physicians’ prescription habits via notifications from one drug to another drug, which was not identical
in its chemical formulation, resulted in a 5 percent self-compliance and a 2 percent assisted
compliance rate. Evidently, physicians did not perceive the HMO-recommended drug as an adequate
substitute. Analysis of response time, next, allows an insight into their way of thinking.
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Figure 6. Resistance to Notifications (Non-Compliance)

4.6. Physician Response Time to Substitute Notifications
We calculated average response time (elapsed between initial and final choices) using two methods:
1) elimination of 10 percent of outliers (exhibiting an unrealistically long response time possibly due to
pausing during the prescription process in order to accomplish another task), and 2) using log(time),
an arithmetic procedure that shortens the upper tail relative to the lower tail. As displayed in Table 3,
the results were quite similar for both methods: non-compliance took longer than assisted compliance
in the generic substitution group (p<0.001), but in the therapeutic substitution group assisted
compliance took significantly longer than non-compliance (p<0.001), in spite of the extra time required
to fill the non-compliance form.
Table 3. Time to Prescription Completion
Prescriptions

Generic
Therapeutic

Min

Max

Mean

St. Dev.

Compliance

Method 1: Eliminating 10% of outliers

Assisted-

126,532

0.08

29.99

2.61

3.05

Non-

74,449

0.12

29.97

2.84

2.74

Assisted-

26,390

0.11

29.99

4.48

4.62

Non-

286,849

0.14

29.98

3.53

3.32

514,220

0.08

29.99

3.25

3.30

Total

Mean
Time (sec)

Method 2: log(time)
Generic
Therapeutic

Total

Assisted-

127,585

-2.53

7.38

0.66

0.79

2.64

Non-

74,864

-2.12

6.60

0.84

0.63

2.83

Assisted-

27,096

-2.21

8.49

1.21

0.94

5.19

Non-

289,824

-1.97

7.15

1.06

0.68

3.62

519,369

-2.53

8.49

0.94

0.74

3.35
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4.7. Compliance Patterns and Physician Demographic Traits
In a multinomial logistic regression, all independent factorial variables express odds of showing
assisted compliance or non-compliance, respectively, compared to demonstrating self-compliance
relative to the last category of the variable, with all other variables being equal. Continuous factors
represent odds compared to an increase of one standard deviation. The model explained between 31
percent (Cox and Snell) and 36.8 percent (Negelkerke pseudo R-square) of the variance in
compliance type. Although all variables were statistically significant, substitution type, either generic
or therapeutic, had a dominant effect on the model likelihood (χ2=392,116, df=2, p<0.001), with
average visits per day with the physician (χ2=2,198, df=2, p<0.001), and physician's age (χ2=1,301,
df=2, p<0.001) as second and third in effect size, albeit significantly smaller than substitution type.
Patient age (χ2=469, df=2, p<0.001) and physician's HMO employment type (χ2=222, df=2, p<0.001)
had a much lesser effect. All other variables had a negligible effect on the model likelihood. The odds
(in the form of Exp(B)) entailed by the independent variables on assisted compliance and noncompliance compared to self-compliance are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4. Results of the Multinomial Logistic Regression
Assisted-compliance

B

Std. Error

Wald

df

Sig.

Intercept

-1.47

0.011

17404.36

1

0.000

Generic (vs. Therapeutic)

Exp(B)

95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)
Lower Bound

Upper Bound

-0.03

0.008

17.95

1

0.000

0.97

0.952

0.982

Male (vs. Female)

0.04

0.007

27.79

1

0.000

1.04

1.022

1.050

HMO-employed (vs. Selfemployed)

0.10

0.007

194.22

1

0.000

1.10

1.085

1.115

GP (Vs. Specialist)

-0.03

0.008

17.67

1

0.000

0.97

0.954

0.983

Z-Patient age

-0.02

0.003

32.26

1

0.000

0.98

0.975

0.988

Z- Physician age

-0.13

0.004

972.75

1

0.000

0.88

0.870

0.885

0.02

0.004

19.08

1

0.000

1.02

1.010

1.027

Z- Average Visits per day

-0.11

0.004

1070.25

1

0.000

0.89

0.886

0.898

Eastern Europe education

-0.14

0.008

326.83

1

0.000

0.87

0.858

0.884

Western Europe education

0.08

0.010

72.00

1

0.000

1.09

1.067

1.109

North America education

0.30

0.025

141.14

1

0.000

1.35

1.282

1.414

South America education

-0.14

0.019

54.95

1

0.000

0.87

0.839

0.903

Z - Physician tenure on the job

Non-compliance
Intercept
Generic (vs. Therapeutic)
Male (vs. Female)

0.009

10023.63

1

0.000

0.006

287228.91

1

0.000

0.05

0.051

0.052

0.05

0.006

70.57

1

0.000

1.05

1.039

1.063

HMO-employed (vs. Selfemployed)

-0.01

0.006

0.67

1

0.413

0.99

0.983

1.007

GP (Vs. Specialist)

-0.01

0.008

1.84

1

0.175

0.99

0.974

1.005

Z-Patient age
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0.91
-2.97

0.10

0.005

415.65

1

0.000

1.11

1.095

1.117

Z- Physician age

-0.01

0.004

10.77

1

0.001

0.99

0.981

0.995

Z - Physician tenure on the job

-0.02

0.004

41.52

1

0.000

0.98

0.969

0.983

Z- Average Visits per day

0.02

0.003

37.30

1

0.000

1.02

1.012

1.024

Eastern Europe education

0.01

0.007

3.67

1

0.055

1.01

1.000

1.027

Western Europe education

-0.07

0.009

61.99

1

0.000

0.93

0.914

0.947

North America education

0.24

0.024

102.79

1

0.000

1.27

1.214

1.333

South America education

-0.05

0.016

8.08

1

0.004

0.95

0.924

0.986
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4.8. Estimated Cost Savings
We calculated a lower bound on drug cost savings in millions of New Israeli Shekel (NIS), with the
exchange rate during the data collection period between 4.4 and 4.7 NIS to one US dollar. Cost
calculations were based on the difference between the cost of the initial and final drug choices
(private pharmacy prices, since the studied HMO refused to disclose paid prices), reflecting cost
savings associated with assisted compliance. The total estimated cost of drugs in the 1.21 million
satisfying prescriptions was 246.67 million NIS, of which 67 percent (165.78 Million NIS) was for
chronic drugs and 33 percent (80.89 million NIS) for acute ones. Table 5 displays the estimated
savings in monetary and percentage terms for acute (one time) and chronic (long term) drugs,
keeping in mind savings achieved for the latter have a long-term cumulative impact due to dominance
(67 percent) and life-long (chronic) consumption. As evident from Table 5, savings for chronic drugs
(4.7 percent) were higher than for acute ones (2.39 percent). The lower savings on acute drugs may
have stemmed from the fact that physicians generally did not comply with substitutes for antibiotics,
the most commonly prescribed acute drugs, but the associated savings have a short-term effect
anyway. Altogether, the estimated lower bound on cost savings amounted to 1.6 million NIS (an
average of 3.6 percent savings). It is plausible that higher savings are achieved assuming that
physicians become accustomed to prescribing generic drugs as a result of using the system, as
evident by the large proportion of self-compliance behavior.
Table 5. Savings (in Million NIS)
Acute Drugs Cost

Chronic Drugs Cost

Initial choice

Final choice

Difference
(%)

Initial choice

Final choice

Difference
(%)

Generic substitutes

15.2

14.8

0.4 (2.39)

14.1

13.6

0.5 (4.72)

Therapeutic substitutes

22.2

22.0

0.2 (1.46)

11.7

11.2

0.5 (4.63)

Total

37.4

36.8

0.6 (1.46)

25.8

24.8

1.0 (4.68)

5. Discussion and Conclusions
The spiraling spending on healthcare, in general, and the growing relative proportion of drug costs, in
particular, merit special attention to measures to contain drug costs taken by healthcare providers and
insurers. Several questions guided this study, the fundamental one being whether it is possible to gain
physicians' compliance with drug prescription procedures preferred by the HMO to contain costs. In
other words, when so notified by the system, do physicians comply with an HMO's notification, rethink their initial drug choice, and prescribe instead an HMO-preferred substitute? Other questions
stemming from the primary one are: Is compliance context-dependent? Does compliance depend on
personal or environmental traits? Is such notification capacity associated with a financial contribution?
In addition to addressing these issues, we reflect on the theoretical implications of the results,
showing how a theory stemming from the behavioral and organizational sciences can contribute to
explaining the clinical behavior of physicians. Added to the information systems aspect, it emphasizes
the multi-disciplinary approach adopted in this study.

5.1. Limitations
A major limitation of this study is that the studied environment was dynamic during the data collection
period, as is the case with any real business environment during a long period of 40 weeks. In this
dynamic environment, changes were introduced both to drugs and to the organizational drug
formulary, causing some interference. These changes were documented and eventually accounted
for in the results, actually contributing to a broader understanding of physicians' behavior by allowing
for example illustration and observation of learning curves. Another limitation lies in the fact that only
about half of the drugs included in the HMO’s formulary had recommended substitutes, yet these
were the most frequently prescribed drugs. An additional limitation is related to the use of private
pharmacy prices for calculating drug costs, since the HMO was reluctant to disclose prices it pays for
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drugs. Therefore, drug cost savings should be regarded as demonstration rather than actual
monetary cost savings. Finally, we studied only one HMO, therefore, external validity may be
questionable. Although more research is called for, we believe that the results can be generalized to
other HMOs and healthcare providers, and that HMOs employing a similar intervention under
comparable conditions can experience parallel results, particularly because no organizational or
personal characteristics were found to affect compliance as strongly as the type of substitute.

5.2. Summary of the Results
The results show that physicians tended to comply more with notifications about generic substitute
drugs than with notifications about therapeutic substitutes. The fact that new drugs and new drug
recommendations have been introduced during the study period allowed drawing learning curves,
showing that users of the notification capacity of the system learned to comply when convinced that a
recommended substitute was an identical drug, demonstrating in these cases a steep learning curve
and a high rate of compliance (self-compliance and assisted compliance combined). In contrast, the
level of compliance when physicians doubted the adequacy of the recommended substitutes
remained low throughout. Moreover, users spent a longer time examining therapeutic substitutes,
evidently contemplating the adequacy of the recommendations. This result attests to the fact that
compliance is not automatic but a cognitive and calculated process. Several demographic traits were
found to marginally affect the various compliance types, the most notable of which are the effects of
employment type, expertise, age, and work load. Finally, a cautious estimate of drug cost savings
showed that such a system holds promise for significant cost containment.

5.3. Theoretical Interpretation
The fact that physicians tended to more readily comply with notifications about generic substitute
drugs, and demonstrated a rather reactant behavior when asked to substitute a prescribed drug with
a non-identical therapeutic substitute, shows that issues pertaining to procedural justice may have
been involved. The difference in response time between the two types of substitutes likewise lends
support to this interpretation.
Substitution with generic drugs adheres more to the six criteria proposed by Leventhal (1976) for a
procedure to be perceived fair, than does substitution with therapeutic drugs, because the generic
drug is supposed to be identical to the patent drug. Therefore, this procedure can be perceived as
free of bias (in spite of the fact that the HMO benefits from the substitute, yet seemingly at no
professional or ethical harm), and it clearly conforms to prevailing standards of ethics and morality.
The additional information provided for each drug on the HMO's formulary contributed to the
perceptions of informational justice, and no interactional unfair conduct could have been associated
with this substitution procedure.
In contrast, there is strong evidence that therapeutic substitutes invoked perceptions of unjust
procedures. Physicians might not have been convinced of the adequacy of the substitution, which
could be an explanation for the extra time taken for this decision. For example, they could have
perceived this recommendation as merely representing the vested interest of the HMO to save money
at the expense of patients. Physicians could clearly regard such a notion as hindering their
professional efficacy and autonomy, rendering a rather reactant response (Vashitz et al., 2009). It may
very well be that these recommendations were additionally interpreted as unfair interactional conduct
between HMO's management and physicians whose voice might not have been heard, or at least not
adequately regarded (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Assuming that physicians perceive themselves as
representing the well-being of their patients, they may also regard therapeutic substitute
recommendations as interactional injustice toward their patients, as well as an informational unjust
procedure, because patients might not possess the full information concerning the nature of the drug
substitute.
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5.4. Implications for Research
Future research should investigate reasons for the elicited compliance behavior possibly by using
scales measuring the organizational justice constructs (Colquitt, 2001) focusing on procedural,
interactional, and informational justice, which are more relevant to this context. In-depth interviews
with physicians who demonstrate various compliance behaviors can also greatly contribute to
understanding their motivations.
Although the three types of organizational justice seem more relevant to the investigated context, the
negative effect of workload on compliance possibly suggests some form of distributive justice issue. It
is plausible that overloaded physicians feel that resources and outcomes are not justly distributed,
hence they develop a form of resentment expressed by not complying with a recommendation that, if
adhered to, would save costs for the presumably unjust employer. We suggest this topic for future
research.
Further work along this trajectory will shed light on the important topic of adherence to administrative
procedures. Results of such work should be of interest to researchers in healthcare administration, to
management scientists who study organizational conduct in the current prevailing environments of
knowledge and knowledgeable workers, and to designers of information systems who could use the
results to develop organizational systems that would be more readily accepted by users if perceived
as adhering to procedural, interactional, and informational justice.

5.5. Implications for Practice
HMOs and other healthcare providers, as well as providers of EMR, particularly drug prescription
systems, can benefit from the results of this study in several ways. First, the results support the
assertion that similar clinical information systems might be effective in reducing drug costs without
impeding quality of healthcare. Nonetheless, compliance with drug notifications is neither automatic
nor immediate, and physicians need to be convinced that the substitute notifications are based on
good clinical practices and are not intended to promote cost savings at the expense of the quality of
care. Furthermore, time is an important determinant for users when deciding whether or not to comply
with a drug substitute notification in an EMR system. Hence, when designing such a system, every
feature, key, and functionality needs to be carefully scrutinized for necessity, and its impact on
response time must be evaluated.
Our findings relating compliance to employment type and specialty suggest that HMOs might choose
to act proactively and differentially toward increasing compliance via educational programs as well as
incentives aimed at driving compliance up. In addition, HMOs can revisit and change substitute
recommendations that are difficult for physicians to comply with. Workload has also been found to
negatively affect compliance in certain instances. Employers should evaluate the benefits of a heavier
workload against lost cost savings.
In conclusion, this study illustrates the contribution of an EMR system with a substitute notification
capacity built into a drug prescription module in a generally complex and difficult field, where benefits,
in general, and economic impacts, in particular, are not easily obtained and demonstrated. However,
more research is called for to further substantiate these results.
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Appendices
Appendix A.
Exhibit A-1. Alerts to the Existence of a Preferred Substitute

Have you considered
prescribing
ENALAPRIL/CAPTOPRIL

Dr.
The drug you are prescribing has a
substitute that is preferred by
experts in the organization.
Therefore, please justify your
choice in the following form. Do you
want to choose another drug?

NO

YES
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Appendix B.
Exhibit B-1. A Digital Form to Justify Drug Prescription When not Complying with Drug
Substitute Recommendation
Justification for
prescribing this drug and
not the preferred
substitute
An interaction with
another drug is expected

Past failure with one or
more drugs in the
preferred drugs list

Continuation of a
successful treatment

Another reason
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